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Abstract
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Governments can significantly reduce earthquake 
mortality by implementing and enforcing quake-proof 
construction regulation. The authors examine why many 
governments do not. Contrary to intuition, controlling 
for the strength and location of actual earthquakes, 
mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake 
propensity, where the payoffs to mortality prevention 
are higher. Importantly, however, the government 
response to earthquake propensity depends on country 
income and the political incentives of governments 
to provide public goods to citizens. The opportunity 
costs of earthquake mortality prevention are higher in 
poorer countries; rich countries invest more in mortality 
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for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Department—is part of a larger effort in the departments to study the main sources 
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prevention than poor countries in response to a higher 
earthquake propensity. Similarly, governments that have 
fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as younger 
democracies, autocracies with less institutionalized ruling 
parties and countries with corrupt regimes, respond 
less to an elevated quake propensity. They therefore 
have higher mortality at any level of quake propensity 
compared to older democracies, autocracies with highly 
institutionalized parties and non-corrupt regimes, 
respectively. The authors find robust evidence for these 
predictions in our analysis of earthquake mortality over 
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1. Introduction 
No government can prevent earthquakes. All governments, though, can optimize the 
regulations that reduce mortality when disaster strikes. Yet, earthquake mortality varies 
widely and systematically across countries. For example, in Japan and California, earthquake 
prone areas known for their strict regulations and enforcement, even large quakes cause few 
fatalities. In other countries and regions, however, much less powerful earthquakes at times 
kill large numbers of people.  
We argue that a set of inter-related factors is responsible for these vast differences in 
mortality. One is that the propensity for experiencing a strong earthquake varies greatly across 
different parts of the world. Since most earthquakes result from sudden movements of 
tectonic plates, most earthquakes occur at the intersection of those plates. However, this does 
not imply that areas where quakes are strongest and most frequent necessarily experience the 
highest quake mortality. Governments in countries with a higher earthquake propensity 
implement more effective earthquake mortality prevention measures. As a consequence, a 
seeming paradox occurs: earthquake mortality is lower in areas with higher quake propensity, 
controlling for the strength of an actually occurring quake.  
This relationship, however, is not unconditional and depends on additional economic 
and political factors that influence governments’ ex ante preventive measures and condition 
the effect of earthquake propensity on earthquake mortality. We identify two sets of 
intervening factors. First, the wealth of countries matters because the opportunity costs of 
earthquake mortality prevention policies tend to be higher at lower levels of per capita 
income. Earthquake-proof construction significantly increases the construction cost of houses 
and infrastructure and in poorer countries households and governments have more effective 
ways to spend scarce resources at their disposal than to invest in earthquake proof 
construction. And second, political incentives such as the level of democracy and 
governments’ ability (or lack thereof) to credibly commit themselves to enforcing effective 3 
earthquake mortality prevention policies condition the inverse relationship between 
earthquake propensity and earthquake mortality. We discuss the underlying causal 
mechanisms in greater detail in section 3. 
In providing a political economy explanation for the variation in earthquake mortality, 
our paper contributes to the literature on the politics of disaster mortality prevention. In an 
influential paper, Kahn (2005) argues that democracy reduces disaster mortality, but he finds 
this result only in specifications where all disaster types are pooled and neither disaster 
magnitude nor the likelihood of disasters are taken into account. Anbarci et al. (2005) suggest 
that inequality reduces the probability that citizens collectively agree to finance construction 
regulation. Empirically, they show that disaster mortality rises with inequality and with 
corruption (Escaleras et al. 2007).   
Our analysis augments and advances on this important prior research in four ways. First, 
we agree with Kahn, Anbarci et al. and Escaleras et al. that failure to reduce avoidable 
disaster mortality is most accurately attributed to weak political incentives. However, while 
these authors argue that political incentives reduce disaster mortality directly, we argue that 
an important channel through which political incentives matter is by conditioning the 
responsiveness of governments to disaster propensity (and vice versa). Thus, for example, 
elected governments are more sensitive than unelected governments to an elevated propensity. 
Second, both democracies and non-democracies exhibit considerable heterogeneity in 
political incentives to provide public goods and to make credible commitments to enforcing 
regulation. We explicitly take this heterogeneity into account, showing that older 
democracies, more institutionalized autocracies and non-corrupt regimes respond more to a 
higher level of earthquake propensity than younger democracies, less institutionalized 
autocracies and corrupt regimes. Third, we argue that income also conditions the effect of 
disaster propensity (and vice versa): richer countries respond more to an elevated quake 
propensity than poorer countries. Fourth, while Anbarci, et al. (2005) and Escaleras, et al. 4 
(2007) also show a strong inverse relationship between earthquake propensity and mortality, 
we are able to improve on previous research designs by constructing measures of the 
magnitude and location of earthquakes and of quake propensity that take into account the 
exponential nature of the Richter scale. We also offer a different explanation for the result: 
propensity not only affects learning by doing, as they argue, but it also affects the opportunity 
costs of investing in earthquake mortality reduction.   
In our empirical analysis of earthquake mortality over the period 1960 to 2005, we find 
ample support for the hypotheses generated from our theory. Not only is earthquake mortality 
lower in democracies, in high quake propensity countries and in rich countries; the 
conditional political and income effects predicted by the theory are also significant and large. 
For example, both income and political incentive effects are contingent on the level of 
earthquake propensity (or, equivalently, country responses to earthquake propensity depend 
on income and political incentives). Thus, we find that an elevated quake propensity lowers 
mortality more in relatively rich than in relatively poor countries. Likewise, democracies in 
which political competitors have greater incentives to provide public goods – older 
democracies – respond more to an elevated quake propensity and thus experience 
significantly less earthquake mortality than other democracies or autocracies. Autocracies in 
which leaders can make credible commitments to party members – autocracies with more 
institutionalized ruling parties – are better able to implement policies such as building 
regulations, are therefore better able to respond to an elevated quake risk and thus also 
experience lower earthquake mortality. The same applies to non-corrupt countries. 
In the next section, we discuss why government intervention is necessary for the 
prevention of earthquake mortality despite the fact that most buildings are privately owned. 
We then develop our theory in several steps, first explaining why there is an inverse 
relationship between earthquake propensity and mortality and then demonstrating how 
income and political incentives condition this effect. After a detailed description of our 5 
research design, we present our main estimation results in section 5 and summarize the 
findings from an extensive set of robustness tests in section 6.  
2.  Earthquake Mortality: The Need for Government Intervention 
Government policies have a substantial influence on disaster mortality through their influence 
on private risk reduction measures and through post-disaster aid (Neumayer and Plümper 
2007; Plümper and Neumayer 2009). The necessity of government intervention in the specific 
case of earthquakes is not entirely obvious, however, since building collapse is the main cause 
of mortality in earthquakes (Osaki and Minowa 2001) and most buildings are privately 
owned. Certainly, government decisions are entirely relevant to the safety of public buildings, 
such as schools and hospitals. However, the assumption that government performance should 
have a large effect on mortality from the collapse of privately constructed and owned 
buildings is less obvious and requires some explanation.  
Three potential market failures might call for government intervention. The most 
common is simply that earthquake-resistant features are costly to verify after construction is 
complete.  Blondet, et al. (no date) point to the clay and straw content of adobe bricks as 
being central to the earthquake resistance of adobe homes. Steel reinforcement bars make a 
well-known contribution to earthquake resistance in concrete buildings, but not only is the 
steel itself not visible (encased, as it is, in concrete), but the durability of the steel depends on 
the quality and quantity of concrete around it. Since these features cannot easily be verified at 
reasonable cost (unless an earthquake occurs), buyers do not wish to pay for them and, in turn, 
they will not be provided. Escaleras, et al. (2007) emphasize this information asymmetry in 
assuming that it is impossible for private parties to contract for high quality construction. In 
the absence of regulation, earthquake mortality is high. 
Information asymmetry, in and of itself, is not a satisfactory explanation for mortality, 
however. Private markets are replete with transactions that entail significant information 6 
asymmetries about product quality. A key feature of these markets is the enforceability of 
contracts to provide quality. Government typically plays a key role here. If governments fail 
to support the enforcement of contracts, private markets are forced to rely on reputational 
mechanisms. These are difficult to implement when construction failures are revealed with 
low probability, following an earthquake. The enforcement of building codes is also likely to 
be weak in environments where contract enforcement is weak. The failure of contract 
enforcement, however, is symptomatic of broader government failures to provide public 
goods.  
Government intervention might also be necessary even if construction quality is 
observable (e.g., by individuals who make daily visits to their home construction site). 
Seismic design requirements are specialized and may not be well-understood by buyers, or by 
building constructors themselves. In this case, information about how to design earthquake-
resistant buildings is a public good that the market may under-supply. Governments that are 
responsive to citizen needs can increase knowledge of seismic design principles; government-
instituted building codes are one way in which they can do this.  
Finally, behavioral distortions are a pervasive phenomenon in the face of low-
probability, high-loss events, when individuals frequently make decisions that lower their 
utility (Kahneman, et al., 1982). Even if fully informed about building quality, buyers may 
care too little about the benefits of building attributes that protect them against low probability 
events. One study in the US shows that if the probability of a disaster falls too low, 
individuals simply stop thinking about it (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989). A laboratory 
experiment in the US concluded that individuals are unwilling to pay anything for insurance 
against low probability events, even if the cost of the event is high (McClelland et al., 1993). 
Private individuals are often reluctant to purchase construction quality, even when doing so 
leaves buyers better off, and government intervention can overcome such reluctance. The 
evidence that higher earthquake propensity has a large and negative effect on earthquake 7 
mortality is an indication that, at least at the societal level, behavioral distortions are muted: 
higher risk appears to be associated with significantly greater mortality prevention efforts. 
These arguments predict that earthquake mortality is lower when governments have 
stronger incentives to provide public goods in the form of enforcement of construction 
contracts and building codes, facilitating the provision of construction quality in private 
markets. Escaleras, et al. (2007), emphasize corrupt payments as the main reason that building 
codes are not enforced. However, if this were true, high mortality countries would be overrun 
with inspectors who fail to do their job in exchange for bribes. This appears not to be the case, 
however. Suggestive cases indicate, instead, that inspectors are few and far between, 
consistent with political disinterest in public good provision. For example, following the 
severe 2009 earthquake in Sumatra, the Wall Street Journal quoted the mayor of the hard-hit 
port city of Padang, with a population of 750,000 as saying that “‘[Construction companies] 
are only thinking about costs, not the safety of the people. . .’ Most of the buildings that 
collapsed were those that didn’t follow updated building codes. . . The local government lacks 
resources to check all buildings . . . with only four staff members to check building licenses.” 
(Wall Street Journal October 6, 2009, p. A11). In contrast, the budget for building and 
residential inspections and construction compliance in Washington, DC, a city with a 
population of approximately 600,000, amounted to 118 full-time equivalent positions.
1 
Income alone is unlikely to account for this large difference, particularly since Washington 
confronts a much smaller quake propensity than Padang.  
                                                 
1 Government of the District of Columbia, Proposed Budget and Financial Plan FY 2010, Volume 2, Agency 
Budget Chapters – Part I, p. B-91, http://cfo.dc.gov/cfo/frames.asp?doc=/cfo/lib/cfo/budget/2010_9_29/vol-
ume_2_agency_chapters_part_i_web.pdf ) 8 
3.  The Politics of Earthquake Mortality Prevention 
In this section, we develop our theory. As already mentioned in the introduction, we argue, 
first, that the opportunity costs of mortality reduction policies depend on a country’s 
earthquake propensity. Higher propensity leads to lower opportunity costs of transferring 
resources to the construction of more quake-proof buildings and thus to lower quake 
mortality.  We focus on deaths from building collapse because these are by far the most 
important source of mortality from earthquake disasters (in contrast to other disasters, such as 
flooding, where disease can have a large mortality effect).  Second, income conditions 
opportunity costs. Specifically, the opportunity costs of expenditures to limit earthquake 
mortality differ across rich and poor countries and rich countries should respond more 
strongly than poor countries to an elevated earthquake propensity. And third, political 
incentives also condition the effect of earthquake propensity on mortality. In countries where 
citizens or members of the ruling party can more easily sanction leaders for poor performance, 
leaders are more likely to take – and to enforce – measures to prevent disaster mortality. In 
such countries, governments should respond more strongly to a higher earthquake propensity. 
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on these arguments. 
3.1.  Earthquake Propensity and Opportunity Costs 
That “earthquakes don’t kill people, (bad) buildings do” may easily be the most common 
cliché in popular discussions of earthquake mortality. It is well-understood that there are few 
technical obstacles to constructing buildings that have a fair chance of surviving even the 
strongest quake. However, the returns to an investment in earthquake-proofing a building vary 
sharply across regions and countries according to their earthquake propensity. It is therefore 
not the case that significant earthquake mortality is necessarily the product of negligence by 
households or governments.  9 
The recent earthquake in Italy provides a case in point. On April 6 2009, an earthquake 
of magnitude 6.3 on the Richter scale struck close to the town of L’Aquila in Central Italy, 
leaving almost 300 people dead and an estimated 28,000 homeless.
2 In contrast, the 1994 
earthquake in Northridge, California, in a densely populated area of southern California, had a 
larger magnitude of 6.7, but killed only 72 people. Aware of these differences in mortality 
across developed countries, many put the blame on the Italian government. For example, 
Franco Barberi, a geologist, argues that a quake of the scale of the L’Aquila quake may have 
occurred “without causing a single death (…) if this happened in California or in Japan or 
some other country where for some time they have been practicing anti-seismic protection.”
3 
Implicit in these criticisms are beliefs regarding malfeasance by government officials. 
Consistent with these beliefs, Italy exhibits much worse scores on cross-country measures of 
corruption than other OECD countries: in 2007, the International Country Risk Guide 
measure of lack of corruption rates Italy at 2.5, compared to an average of 4.5 for the other 22 
members of the OECD for which these data are available. 
Such a conclusion, however, does not take into account the role of earthquake 
propensity. Anbaci, et al. (2005) and Escalantes, et al. (2007) control for the frequency of 
earthquakes in a country in their analysis of earthquake mortality, arguing that countries with 
more experience with earthquakes become better at confronting earthquake risks – they have 
greater opportunity to “learn by doing”. Yet, much more than a “learning by doing” effect is 
likely to be critical. Even in societies that are fully informed about how to mitigate mortality 
risks, governments rationally abstain from passing and enforcing strict construction standards 
in areas with relatively low earthquake propensity, where the opportunity costs of earthquake 
mortality prevention are high. Small reductions in expected mortality demand large transfers 
                                                 
2   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7992936.stm 
3   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7987772.stm 10 
of resources from other uses (health infrastructure, medication, sanitation or, for a household, 
food or education) that yield more than offsetting mortality increases. In the unfortunate event 
that a strong earthquake does occur in a country in which earthquake propensity is low, we 
would therefore expect mortality to be higher. Ex ante, however, this outcome does not 
necessarily imply sub-optimal policy.   
The L’Aquila earthquake illustrates the importance of propensity since, in fact, 
earthquake propensity in Italy is much lower than in California and Japan, which are located 
on two of the world’s geologically most active zones. Italy, in comparison, lies at the very end 
of a zone where the African plate is submerged under the European plate. The L’Aquila quake 
was only the 4
th earthquake above 6.0 on the Richter scale in Italy’s postwar history – and 
none of these quakes reached a 7.0 on the Richter scale. Japan, on the other hand, experienced 
31 quakes above 6.0, eight of which were stronger than 7.0 on the Richter scale. Similarly, 
while Ellwood and Ellwood (1998, cited in Kenny 2009) observe that a previously unknown 
fault triggered the Northridge earthquake, California as a whole experienced 19 earthquakes 
above 6.0, of which six were stronger than 7.0. This comparison understates the true 
difference because of the strong exponential logic of the Richter scale.
4 The seismic energy of 
all earthquakes that occurred in Italy over the last 60 years (approximately the equivalent of 
50-70 megatons TNT), fell far short of the seismic energy of Japan’s strongest single 
earthquake (which had the equivalent of roughly 2000 megatons TNT). In fact, each of the 
seven strongest Japanese earthquakes unleashed more seismic energy than all Italian quakes 
combined. A comparison with Californian earthquakes yields similar conclusions. 
In sum, controlling for the magnitude and the exposure of a country’s population to an 
actually occurring earthquake, mortality should be significantly higher in areas of low 
earthquake propensity, where the ex ante opportunity costs of mortality prevention are high. 
                                                 
4   See appendix 1.  11 
Further below, we will argue that corruption also plays a role and, in fact, conditions the 
effect of earthquake propensity on quake mortality. Bad governance in Italy is therefore likely 
to also have played an important role in the relatively high mortality following the L’Aquila 
earthquake. However, while a quake similar to that in L’Aquila would have cost far fewer 
lives had it happened in Japan or California, Italy would have arguably wasted resources if its 
construction standards had been as strict as those in these areas of high earthquake propensity. 
3.2.   The Conditioning Effect of Income 
With identical earthquake propensities, poor countries face higher mortality than rich 
countries when an earthquake strikes. One reason is that buildings are likely to be better built 
in richer countries for other reasons. Moreover, richer countries can afford more measures to 
reduce mortality in all areas, ranging from disease control to traffic safety to earthquake 
mortality prevention. For any given earthquake propensity, social welfare maximizing 
governments in both rich and poor countries would invest in mortality reduction, but the rich 
country’s budget for mortality reduction is exhausted at a higher level of expenditure that 
results in lower mortality from all causes. 
However, richer and poorer countries should also respond to differences in earthquake 
propensity differently. Under plausible conditions, sensitivity to earthquake propensity 
increases in income. A straightforward way to see this is to compare two cases. In the first 
case, a rich and a poor country with otherwise identical incentives of political leaders to serve 
citizen interests face very low earthquake propensity; neither spends any money on 
earthquake mortality prevention. However, both countries face mortality threats from other 
sources. The poor country, with a tighter budget constraint, spends less to reduce mortality 
from these threats than the rich. This means that the marginal benefit of those expenditures is 
correspondingly higher in the poor than the rich country: the last dollar of expenditure on the 
prevention of, say, infectious diseases prevents more mortality in the poor than in the rich 12 
country. In the second case, the two countries face high earthquake propensity, but with the 
opportunity costs to the poor country of transferring resources away from infectious disease 
prevention to earthquake mortality prevention being higher than they are for the rich country, 
the rich country invests much more in quake-proofing constructions than the poor country in 
response to this higher earthquake propensity. 
There are two conditions under which our argument that income conditions the negative 
effect of earthquake propensity on quake mortality would not hold. We believe neither 
condition is realistic and our empirical results support this contention. The first condition 
would be if it were very cheap to make buildings earthquake-proof, such that opportunity 
costs were not to play a major role. This condition clearly does not hold in reality. Kenny 
(2009), for example, summarizes three scenarios for the retrofitting of schools for earthquake 
mortality prevention, each including assumptions that are within ranges viewed as plausible 
by experts and taking into account the losses incurred by a society if fewer schools are built to 
accommodate the higher costs of retrofitting existing schools. The cost per student death 
averted by retrofitting ranges from $40 to $213,333. The latter figure is orders of magnitude 
larger than the cost of other government interventions that would reduce child mortality in 
many, particularly poorer countries. Although the costs of making buildings earthquake-proof 
at the time of construction are less than retrofitting buildings afterwards, these figures 
nevertheless make it clear that the opportunity costs for earthquake mortality reduction are 
substantial and can be prohibitive.  
Second, our argument would not hold if the marginal costs of reducing earthquake 
deaths were so much lower as to fully cancel out the opportunity cost consideration. However, 
even if it were the case that rich countries, with better buildings independently of earthquake 
propensity, confronted a somewhat higher marginal cost of reducing earthquake mortality, 
which is not clear, the marginal benefits of the last dollar spent on public health or sanitation 
are still likely to be far less than those in poor countries and are therefore better spent on 13 
preventing earthquake mortality. In sum, therefore, we expect that, all other things equal, 
mortality is not only lower the higher a country’s earthquake propensity, but particularly so if 
the country is relatively rich. 
3.3.   The Conditioning Effect of Political Incentives 
Effective government regulation to improve building standards is likely to reduce earthquake 
mortality because the three conditions cited in section 2 undermine private efforts to mitigate 
risk: citizens are myopic when confronted with low-probability, high-risk events; they are 
uninformed about specific seismic design options and their value; and seismic design features 
are only observable at high cost in finished buildings. These government interventions – 
contract enforcement and the elaboration and enforcement of building regulations – have 
public good characteristics and their provision should therefore be subject to the same 
political conditions as the provision of public goods more generally.  
A large literature identifies conditions under which governments have incentives to 
provide public goods such as disaster risk mitigation. Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003), for 
example, argue that the larger is the “selectorate”, the group of people who select the 
government, the more difficult it is for the government to use targeted payoffs to remain in 
power and the more likely the government will rely on public goods instead (see also Plümper 
and Martin 2003). The larger the selectorate, the more it encompasses non-elite members of 
society.  
Competitive elections increase the size of the effective selectorate. Policies implemented 
by democratic governments should therefore, in principle, target a broader population than 
policies implemented by autocracies. They are more likely to provide public goods, benefiting 
all citizens, including policies that reduce the risks to all citizens to die in the event of an 
earthquake. Moreover, since earthquakes are more likely to kill poor people living in sub-
standard housing, and since an expansion of the selectorate generally serves to expand the 14 
enfranchisement of the poor, a larger selectorate should increase government incentives to 
enforce building standards. Whenever natural disasters have a strong distributive effect and 
the elite is significantly less affected than the broader population, an effect of democracy on 
disaster mortality is likely (Plümper and Neumayer 2009), because government survival in 
autocratic regimes depends less on the population and more on the elite than the re-election of 
government in democracies.  
While the theory is clear, democratic institutions, by themselves, are often not associated 
with policy outcomes aligned with the interests of citizens, poor or otherwise. The effects of 
competitive elections on political incentives diminish in the presence of “political market 
imperfections” (Keefer and Khemani 2005) that undercut the ability of voters to hold 
incumbents accountable. Ideally, citizens accurately observe incumbent performance and, in 
the event that performance is poor, can expel the incumbent in favour of a challenger who can 
credibly commit to perform at a higher level. As the comparisons of regime types in Persson 
and Tabellini (2000) make clear, under these circumstances, incumbents have strong 
incentives to provide public goods and to avoid rent-seeking, corrupt behaviour. Yet, for 
many policy areas citizens are uninformed about government performance and political 
challengers cannot credibly commit to do better.  
Disaster mortality prevention exhibits some of these imperfections. Because disaster 
prevention is difficult for citizens to observe (prior to a disaster occurring) and because 
disasters are rare events, such prevention is a low priority for governments.
5 At the same time, 
                                                 
5   Healy and Malhotra (2008) present direct evidence of political biases against disaster risk prevention. 
They document that US federal government spending favors post-disaster relief spending by a large margin over 
spending to prevent damage from disaster: per capita spending on relief was $34.50 in 2000, compared to $1.59 
on prevention, though their calculations suggest that an extra one million dollars in damage prevention was 
associated with a reduction in the present value of future disaster damage of approximately 15 million dollars. 15 
however, politicians cannot completely offset the political consequences of ex ante failures to 
prevent mortality with ex post relief. In India, for example, following rain-related disasters 
citizens tend to vote against politicians from the incumbent ruling party, even if the 
government provides large amounts of ex post assistance to farmers. Average relief spending 
reduces the probability of expulsion by only one-seventh relative to no spending at all (Cole, 
Healy and Werker 2008). Moreover, and more importantly, with the vast majority of 
earthquake victims dying at the time of or shortly after building collapse (Osaki and Minowa 
2001), ex post disaster relief can only play a relatively minor role in the prevention of quake 
mortality. Why, then, would the mere fact of competitive elections lead politicians to invest in 
pre-disaster risk mitigation? 
As Ferejohn (1986) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) demonstrate, even when 
politicians are not credible, voters can still hold incumbents accountable as long as they can 
coordinate on a standard against which to judge incumbent performance. Incumbents who 
meet this standard are re-elected; incumbents who do not are expelled, regardless of 
challenger characteristics. While, in general, ex post performance standards hold governments 
only weakly accountable, this is less so in policy areas for which crisis clearly exposes the 
scope of government failure, as earthquakes do.
6 In contrast to other policy areas where 
performance failure is difficult to detect, such as education, once an earthquake occurs, 
government policy failures are obvious and coordination around a performance standard faces 
few obstacles: citizens all observe the same effects, and the scale of policy failure ensures that 
citizens will jointly regard the failure as particularly salient in judging performance. 
Democracies, where citizens can more easily enforce ex post performance standards, should 
therefore exhibit lower earthquake mortality. 
                                                 
6   Keefer (2007) finds, for example, that the fiscal costs of banking crises are as much as 22 percentage 
points of GDP lower in countries with competitive elections. 16 
Nevertheless, even among democracies variation in incentives of governments to 
provide public goods or to engage in rent-seeking at the expense of public good provision 
should also matter for earthquake mortality. A large difference among democracies stems 
from the ability of political competitors to make broadly credible commitments to citizens. 
Democracies in which this is not the case are less likely to provide public goods (Keefer and 
Vlaicu 2008). Keefer (2007) argues that credibility differences between democracies with 
more and fewer years of continuous competitive elections explain the distinct policy choices 
of these two groups: younger democracies provide a lower level of public goods than older, 
more established democracies. Consequently, even if all politicians have stronger incentives 
to provide ex post disaster relief than ex ante measures to mitigate mortality, politicians in 
democracies with more continuous years of competitive elections should provide higher levels 
of regulation for making buildings earthquake-proof than those in democracies with fewer 
continuous years of competitive elections. 
Compared to democracies, autocracies of all kinds tend to actively discourage collective 
action by citizens. Consequently, even though it may be easier for citizens to coordinate a 
collective response after a disaster than after other policy failures, it is sufficiently difficult to 
coordinate any collective response against the autocratic rulers. Autocracies do vary, 
however, in the degree to which leaders allow ruling party members to organize collectively 
(that is, the extent to which they allow ruling-party institutionalization). Autocrats who do not 
permit collective organization by ruling party members are less able to make credible 
commitments to those members, making it difficult for leaders to promise rewards to party 
members who successfully implement leader policy initiatives (Gehlbach and Keefer 2009). 
Regulations to reduce earthquake mortality are therefore less likely to be introduced or 
effectively enforced in settings where party members cannot collectively organize.  
Lastly, both democracies and autocracies exhibit large within-regime type differences in 
the degree of corruption, which is also associated with weak incentives to pursue the broad 17 
public interest and to provide public goods. Where political incentives to restrain corruption 
are low, incentives to provide public goods are generally (though not always) lower. Even 
when they are not lower, the inability of governments to restrain corruption by public officials 
reduces political incentives to implement policies that are sensitive to corruption, such as 
building regulations. Finally, in corrupt regimes costly regulation – and earthquake-proof 
building regulations are costly for construction companies – can be circumvented by bribing 
government officials. Following this line of reasoning, we expect corrupt regimes to provide 
less regulation for preventing quake mortality than non-corrupt regimes and also to fail in the 
enforcement of such regulations. 
The effects of political incentives are not only direct. They also condition the effects of 
earthquake propensity and, conversely, their effects will be conditioned by earthquake 
propensity. Political incentives to undertake ex ante measures to limit mortality, driven by the 
threat of ex post accountability analyzed by Ferejohn, rise with the level of earthquake 
propensity, since the higher the probability that a strong earthquake occurs in this period, the 
higher the probability that citizens will hold current policy-makers accountable for failing to 
act. That is, the greater is the probability of a strong earthquake, the greater the role for 
political incentives to reduce earthquake mortality. However, since democracies are more 
responsive than autocracies, they should also respond more to a higher earthquake propensity 
than autocracies. In other words, democratic governments are likely to enact more and better 
earthquake safety regulations relative to autocracies the higher the earthquake propensity of 
the country and we expect that quakes of the same magnitude not only kill fewer people the 
higher earthquake propensity, but particularly so if the country is democratic.  
This reasoning is analogous to the earlier discussion of the conditioning effect of income 
on propensity. When propensity is very low, neither autocracies nor democracies have an 
incentive to take precautionary measures. When it is high, democracies have a greater 
incentive than autocracies. The difference in precautionary measures between high and low 18 
propensity democracies must, therefore, be greater than between high and low propensity 
autocracies. Similar arguments apply for the remaining political incentives identified in our 
discussion above. Older democracies should respond more to a higher earthquake propensity 
and thus have lower mortality at each level of propensity than younger democracies. The 
same holds true for autocracies with more institutionalized ruling parties relative to those with 
less institutionalized ruling parties and for less corrupt relative to more corrupt regimes. 
3.4. Hypotheses 
In sum, our theory generates six testable hypotheses. First, all other things equal and 
controlling for the strength and location of earthquakes in particular, quake mortality is lower 
in countries with a higher earthquake propensity. Second, a higher quake propensity lowers 
mortality more in relatively rich than in relatively poor countries. Third, a higher propensity 
also lowers mortality more in democratic than in autocratic countries. Fourth, politicians in 
older democracies have stronger incentives to provide public goods than younger democracies 
and an elevated quake propensity thus lowers mortality more in the former than in the latter. 
Fifth, autocracies with more institutionalized ruling parties are better able to commit to 
providing public goods and, especially, to implement construction regulations, and thus 
experience lower mortality at higher quake propensity than less institutionalized autocracies. 
Finally, non-corrupt regimes not only face higher incentives to provide public goods, but are 
also in a better position to enforce appropriate regulation than corrupt regimes. In contrast, in 
corrupt regimes earthquake-proof construction regulation is not only less likely, but if existent 
is unlikely to be enforced. As a consequence, a higher quake propensity should lower 
mortality more in non-corrupt than in corrupt regimes. 
These hypotheses are helpful in clarifying whether the effects of earthquake propensity 
reflect the opportunity costs of investing in risk mitigation or reflect learning by doing. If 
learning-by-doing is solely the product of experience with earthquakes and costs nothing (that 19 
is, if propensity does not at all reflect opportunity costs of investing in lower earthquake 
mortality, including learning about how to respond best to quake risks), then income and 
political characteristics should have no effect on the relationship between propensity and 
mortality. Only if learning-by-doing requires costly investments should we expect such 
contingent effects to emerge. In that case, however, one is immediately in the world of 
opportunity costs: countries with the greatest incentives to invest in learning-by-doing, and in 
preventing earthquake mortality generally, are those in which the opportunity costs of making 
these investments are low, and in which political incentives to make them are high. In other 
words, if we find evidence for our hypotheses that the effects of quake propensity on 
mortality are contingent on factors such as the income and political characteristics of 
countries, then this supports the conclusion that opportunity cost plays a large role, whether or 
not there is learning by doing. 
 
4.   Research Design 
To test these hypotheses, we analyze the determinants of earthquake mortality over the period 
1960 to 2005. In this section, we describe our research design in detail. 
4.1. Data Sources and Operationalization 
Our dependent variable is the annual sum of earthquake deaths in a country, with data taken 
from EM-DAT (2008).
7 We take the sum of fatalities in a country year rather than fatalities 
from individual earthquakes as the unit of analysis since practically all of our control 
variables are measured at the country year level. Aggregation is unlikely to affect the 
                                                 
7    See Neumayer and Plümper (2007) for a discussion of the weaknesses of this dataset, which is, 
however, the only publicly accessible source of disaster type-specific mortality data. 20 
estimates, however, since in the vast majority of country years no more than one large 
earthquake occurs (smaller follow-on quakes after a major quake notwithstanding).  
Similar to Kahn (2005), we limit the estimation sample to observations at risk of 
mortality. This is important because country years in which no major earthquakes happened 
are not at risk; no one could have possibly been killed by an earthquake. They are irrelevant 
and their inclusion would therefore inject unnecessary noise into the estimation. We therefore 
restrict the sample to country years in which at least one quake of magnitude 5 on the Richter 
scale happened. 
A key challenge in assessing the effect of earthquake propensity, economic constraints 
and political incentives on mortality is to control for the magnitude of earthquakes. Mortality 
is higher, all else equal, the greater the magnitude of an earthquake and the larger the number 
of people exposed to it. We therefore construct, and control for, two magnitude variables, one 
capturing magnitude itself, and one capturing magnitude weighted by the number of people in 
the area affected by the earthquake.  
The measure of magnitude begins with each earthquake’s measure on the Richter scale. 
The Richter scale is on a base-10 logarithmic scale: small increases on the scale imply large 
increases in disaster magnitude. To ensure that disaster exposure properly reflects the much 
larger impact of earthquakes with a larger Richter score, we transform the Richter scale 
magnitude according to the formula 10exp(magnitude-5). We compare all the earthquakes in a 
country year and select the one with the highest transformed magnitude value, 
max_magnitude. The second variable (magnitude_popdensity) additionally takes into account 
that earthquakes in more densely populated areas kill more people, ceteris paribus. This 
variable weights each transformed quake magnitude value by the average population density 
within 15 kilometers of the earthquake’s epicentre, though results are robust to extending this 
boundary to 30 or to 50 kilometers. It then sums up all population density-weighted 21 
transformed quakes in a country year.
8 The earthquake data have been taken from the United 
States Geological Survey Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS) Composite Earthquake 
Catalogue. Population density data are sourced from Gridded Population of the World, 
Version 3. 
Earthquake propensity, the first variable of main interest, though not directly observable, 
can be indirectly inferred from historical earthquake records. Earthquakes are unevenly 
distributed around the world and are far more likely to occur in regions where different 
tectonic plates border each other. Figure 1 shows the global distribution of earthquakes and 
the borders of tectonic plates. Most earthquakes occur at the various borders of the Pacific 
plate, the Western border of the Latin American plate, and the boundaries between the 
African, the Arabic and the Indian plates and the Eurasian plate. It is in countries located in 
these regions that the opportunity costs of earthquake safety regulation are lowest. 
                                                 
8   Minor quakes are unlikely to cause major damage, let alone kill people, so we drop all quakes with a 
magnitude below five on the Richter scale for constructing this variable. 22 
Figure 1: Tectonic Plates and Earthquake Activity (Source: ETH Zürich, Global Seismic 
Hazard Assessment Program). 
 
We use as a simple proxy for earthquake propensity the sum of earthquake strengths of 
quakes above magnitude 6 over the period 1960 to 2008, transformed according to the above 
mentioned formula. Results are robust to counting the sum of earthquakes above magnitude 5 
or 6.5 instead. They are equally robust to using instead the strongest earthquake over the 
period 1960 to 2008. This is not surprising, since the total number of earthquakes a country 
experiences is strongly correlated with the magnitude of its single most powerful earthquake.
9 
It may seem strange to use a variable that contains information up to 2008 for estimations that 
start in 1960. However, this variable is meant to proxy for latent earthquake propensity.  
                                                 
9 We take 1960 as the start year because our dataset on earthquakes starts in this year. Our results are fully robust 
to using the highest observed earthquake magnitude experienced since 1900 instead, derived from data collected 
by the United States Geological Survey (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical.php). 23 
The other main explanatory variables are country income and political characteristics. 
Data on income per capita (ln gdppc) are taken from World Bank (2009). Democracy is 
measured by the polity2 variable taken from the Polity project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 
2006). Despite being coded on a 21-point scale from -10 to 10, polity2 is not truly a 
continuous variable and observations are heavily clustered toward the lower and upper end of 
the scale. In line with much of the political science literature, we therefore dichotomize the 
democracy variable and classify a country as a democracy if it has a polity2 score of 5 or 
above, which holds true for roughly 40 per cent of country years. The age of democracy is 
measured by the number of years since a country has become a democracy, defined as 5 or 
above on the Polity scale. The institutionalization of the ruling party in non-democracies is 
calculated as the age of the largest government party less the years in office of the current 
leader, with both variables taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 
2001), which starts in 1975, thus restricting the relevant sample to the 1975 to 2005 period. 
The last variable that captures the political incentives of governments is corruption. 
Corruption measures are subjective and available only for recent periods. We use the source 
that provides the earliest time coverage, the corruption index of the International Country 
Risk Guide from Political Risk Services (www.prsgroup.com). They report corruption data 
from 1982 onwards and the estimation model which includes corruption as an explanatory 
variable is therefore restricted to the period 1982 to 2005. As a further control variable we use 
the log of population size (ln pop) from World Bank (2009) since more populous countries 
will face larger mortality, all other things equal. 
Our hypotheses postulate that income and political incentives condition the effect of 
earthquake propensity to pursue policies that reduce earthquake mortality. Such conditional 
effects are typically estimated in a model in which two or more variables are interacted. 
Unfortunately, the interpretation of interacted terms of two or more continuous variables is 
problematic in non-linear models. As Ai and Norton (2003: 129) have shown, in nonlinear 24 
models “the interaction effect (…) cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, 
magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient of the interaction term.” Instead, the 
interpretation of the interaction term requires computing the cross derivative of the expected 
value of the dependent variable, which depends on all the covariates in the model and their 
values. Testing the significance of interaction terms in non-linear models with two or more 
continuous variables is thus an extremely complex task.  
Instead, we interact dummy variables for our main variables of interest with the 
continuous earthquake propensity variable. This is easiest done for our measure of regime 
type, which is already captured by a dummy variable for democracy. We thus interact dummy 
variables for democracies and autocracies with earthquake propensity. These estimated 
coefficients are not subject to the difficulty identified by Ai and Norton (2003). They indicate 
how mortality changes with increases in earthquake propensity in democracies on the one 
hand versus increases in earthquake propensity in autocracies on the other. This formulation is 
equivalent to, but easier to interpret than interacting a single democracy dummy variable, 
equal to one for democratic and zero for non-democratic countries, with propensity.
10 
We similarly interact, in separate estimations, the continuous propensity variable with 
dummy variables for high-income versus low-income (or, to be precise, “not high-income”) 
countries, using the World Bank (2009) classification, to estimate different earthquake 
                                                 
10 To see this, imagine an estimation model of the form y = b1x+b2z+b3xz, with x a continuous and z a dummy 
variable. The marginal effect of x on y is given by b1 for z=0 and by (b1+b3) for z=1. Now consider instead an 
estimation model of the form y = b4x (for z=0) + b5x (for z=1) + b6z. b4 is the same as b1, while b5 is the same as 
(b1+b3). In the first model, the interaction effect is statistically significant if b3 is statistically significantly 
different from zero. In the second model, it is significant if b4 and b5 are statistically significantly different from 
each other.  25 
propensity coefficients for these two groups of countries.
11 About 25 per cent of countries are 
classified as having high-income. The earthquake propensity variable is also interacted with a 
dummy variable for democracies with below median continuous years of democracy and 
above median continuous years of democracy; while for autocracies the propensity variable is 
interacted with a dummy variable for, respectively, below and above median age of the ruling 
party, relative to the leader’s years in office. The final interaction specification is between 
earthquake propensity and dummy variables for corrupt and non-corrupt regimes, where we 
classify a country as non-corrupt if it scores 4 or above on the scale that runs from 0 (most 
corrupt) to 6 (free of corruption). Roughly 35 per cent of country years fall into the ‘not 
corrupt’ category. 
4.2 Estimation Strategy 
The earthquake mortality dependent variable is a strictly non-negative count variable for 
which ordinary least squares (OLS) is inappropriate as it violates the underlying OLS 
assumptions of linearity of the estimation model and of normally distributed errors. There are 
two main estimation models for count data – Poisson and negative binomial. Since the sample 
variance significantly exceeds the sample mean, we have opted for the negative binomial 
model. The zero-inflated negative binomial model is sometimes employed to deal with the 
presence of many observations in which no disaster deaths occur. Although others have 
estimated disaster mortality determinants using this model (Kahn 2005), we decided against 
the zero-inflated model for two reasons. First, we already restrict the estimation sample to 
relevant country years, i.e. to country years with at least one quake of a magnitude large 
enough to potentially cause mortality. As a consequence, the share of observations with zero 
                                                 
11 Our results are fully robust to interacting the earthquake propensity variable with dummy variables for OECD 
countries and non-OECD countries instead, also following World Bank (2009) classification. 26 
mortality is not excessively large (roughly 20 per cent of observations exhibit positive 
mortality). Second, the zero-inflated negative binomial model assumes that some observations 
take on a value of zero with probability of one (Long & Freese, 2006). This is not a 
reasonable assumption, however, given that the sample is intentionally restricted to country 
years at risk of earthquake mortality.  
5.   Results 
Table 1 presents the main estimation results. In the baseline model 1, quake propensity is not 
interacted with any dummy variable. As one would expect, quakes of higher magnitude on the 
transformed Richter scale and quakes of higher magnitude in more densely populated areas 
kill more people. Controlling for the strength of actually occurring earthquakes in this way, 
we find that a higher quake propensity is associated with lower mortality, as our theory 
predicts and as Anbaci, et al. (2005) first documented with a much different sample and 
propensity measure. Countries with higher per capita income and democracies have lower 
fatalities, whereas a larger population leads to higher mortality. 
In model 2, we interact the quake propensity variable with dummy variables for high-
income and low-income countries, thus in effect estimating separate quake propensity 
coefficients for these two groups of countries. Both rich and poor countries respond to 
increasing earthquake propensity: mortality falls significantly with higher quake propensities 
in both sets of countries. However, the effects are significantly larger for rich countries. The 
difference between the two estimated coefficients is statistically significant at p<.001. In 
substantive terms, keeping all other variables at mean values, a one standard deviation 
increase in quake propensity lowers the expected count of quake fatalities by 62.8 per cent in 
rich countries and by 46.5 per cent in poor countries. This supports the earlier opportunity 
cost argument: poor countries face a larger opportunity cost of transferring resources to 27 
earthquake mortality prevention than rich countries such that they respond less to an elevated 
earthquake propensity than rich countries.
12 
Model 3 interacts the quake propensity variable with dummy variables for democracies 
and autocracies. Consistent with the argument that the prospect of elections should make 
democratic rulers more sensitive to earthquake propensity, the estimated coefficient for quake 
propensity in democracies is 2/3 larger than the respective estimated coefficient in autocracies 
(-.0044 versus -.0029), although the difference between the two estimated coefficients is not 
statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in quake propensity is estimated to 
decrease expected mortality by 49.4 per cent in democracies and by 42.2 per cent in 
autocracies, if other variables are held at mean values. The statistically significant coefficient 
of the linear democracy term indicates that democratic governments suffer significantly fewer 
earthquake deaths at all levels of quake risk. 
Model 4 further distinguishes among both democratic and non-democratic regimes. The 
specification distinguishes among autocracies according to whether the age of the ruling party 
at the time the current leader came to power – ruling-party institutionalization – is above or 
below the median for that variable (see Gehlbach and Keefer 2009). Democracies are 
distinguished according to whether they are above or below the median years of continuous 
democratic experience.
13 Since the Database of Political Institutions starts in 1975, and is 
                                                 
12 Given the strong correlation of high income with good governance, it is difficult to exclude an alternative 
explanation for this finding, namely that poor countries are also generally governed by rulers who are less 
sensitive to the broad public interest and, therefore, less responsive to increases in earthquake risk. However, this 
interpretation of the risk-income interaction is also consistent with our theoretical arguments. 
13   Since we use two different operationalizations for democracies on the one hand and autocracies on the 
other, there is no single variable which could be added to the estimation model to capture the direct effects of 
within-regime type heterogeneity on mortality. Results, though, are substantively similar, with all variables 
statistically significant as before, if we re-estimate the model with two additional variables, namely the number 28 
required for the ruling-party institutionalization variable, the sample in this estimation is 
smaller than for the other models. Consistent with our prediction, autocracies with low 
institutionalization are non-responsive to increases in earthquake propensity, whereas 
increasing propensity significantly reduces mortality in autocracies with high 
institutionalization. Increasing propensity reduces mortality even more in democracies and 
particularly so in older democracies, which react more to increasing propensity than young 
democracies (difference statistically significant at p<.002), which in turn react more than 
autocracies with high institutionalization, even if the difference is not statistically significant 
at conventional levels. A one standard deviation increase in quake propensity decreases the 
expected count of quake deaths by 64.4 per cent in old democracies, by 42.9 per cent in young 
democracies and by 35.7 per cent in autocracies with high institutionalization (all other 
variables at mean values). 
In the final model 5, we test whether corruption conditions the effect of earthquake 
propensity on quake mortality. Since the corruption variable is available only since 1982, the 
sample size is further reduced. Consistent with the notion that political incentives to provide 
earthquake-proof construction regulation require a non-corrupt political regime, we find that 
corrupt regimes are totally unresponsive to an increase in earthquake propensity, while non-
corrupt regimes are responsive to elevated earthquake risk with a standard deviation increase 
in quake propensity estimated as decreasing the expected count of quake fatalities by 50.3 per 
                                                                                                                                                         
of years of continuous democratic experience (set to zero for autocracies) and the number of years in office of 
the largest government party minus the number of years in office of the current leader. The only exception is 
that, while quake propensity continues to have the highest effect on mortality in older democracies, followed by 
younger democracies and then by autocracies with high intstitutionalization, the difference in the effect of quake 
propensity between older and younger democracies is no longer statistically significant, while the difference 
between younger democracies and autocracies with high institutionalization now becomes significant. 29 
cent (all other variables at mean values). Beyond this conditioning effect on earthquake 
propensity, corruption has no independent effect on quake mortality. 
6. Robustness 
The results reported in table 1 are robust to a number of potential mis-specifications of the 
estimation model – see table 2.
14 First, it could be argued that the results are driven by the 
specific cut-off that we employ for measuring earthquake propensity. However, in all but two 
cases, results are similar in terms of coefficient signs and statistical significance when we 
substitute into all of the models of table 1 a propensity measure that uses, instead of a 
threshold of 6 on the Richter scale, a threshold of 5 (column 1) or 6.5 (column 2), or simply 
the largest earthquake that the country experienced over the period 1960-2005 (column 3).
15 
Anbaci et al. (2005) limit their sample to observations in which earthquakes of 
magnitude six and above on the Richter scale caused at least ten fatalities or approximately $1 
million in property damages. This implies selecting on the dependent variable since very 
successful earthquake fatality and damage prevention measures can lead to the exclusion of 
observations from the relevant population that should be in the sample. Moreover, smaller 
earthquakes can also have fatal consequences. Nevertheless, if we follow their lead and only 
include earthquakes above 6 (column 4), instead of above 5, on the Richter scale in the 
sample, results are fully robust. 
The political incentives of leaders who have been in office for longer periods of time 
could differ from those newly in office and this could be correlated to the political measures 
we include, yielding spurious estimates. However, when we include the number of years the 
chief executive has been in office then all effects remain essentially the same (column 5). 
                                                 
14   Full results will be made available in a replication dataset and do-file upon publication of the article. 
15   All measures exponentially transformed as before. 30 
Mortality is significantly lower the more years leaders are in office, suggesting that longer-
serving leaders are more likely to internalize the future political costs of neglecting 
earthquake preparedness. Results reported in column 5 of table 2 also demonstrate that the 
results in models 1-3 are robust to the post-1975 sample. In fact, in this sample, which is 
restricted to the post-1975 period since the variable measuring the tenure length of the chief 
executive is only available from 1975 onwards, not only is the magnitude of the democratic 
response to increased propensity greater than that of the autocratic response, as in model 3, 
but the difference becomes statistically significant if the sample is restricted to the post-1975 
period. 
The exact death toll of earthquakes is typically unobserved. Therefore, no one actually 
knows the exact number of quake victims, which is instead estimated. There can thus be no 
doubt that the estimation results we have reported in the previous section are based on the 
analysis of noisy data. We therefore conducted a Monte Carlo study, similar to what Plümper 
and Neumayer (2009) do for mortality from famines, which aims at exploring the effect of 
measurement error on the estimates. Specifically, we re-estimated all models 100 times. In 
each re-estimation, we multiplied the value of the dependent variable of approximately 15 
percent of observations by a uniform random number of the interval [0.5..1.5], which mirrors 
measurement errors of up to 50 percent.
16 By drawing the measurement error from a uniform 
distribution, it is on average unlikely to be correlated with the explanatory variables. 
However, the actually drawn measurement error in each iteration may well be correlated with 
some of the regressors even if the average correlation over infinite iterations is zero. By 
                                                 
16   To determine the ‘subsample with measurement error’ we drew a second continuous uniform random 
variable of the interval (0..1) and changed only those observations for which the randomly drawn parameter 
exceeded 0.85. Thus, on average, we changed the dependent variable of about 15 percent of the ‘nonzeros’ in 
each iteration of the MC. 31 
reporting the full range of coefficients from the Monte Carlo study (minimum to maximum) 
in table 3, we take each single iteration into consideration and thus account not only for 
random measurement error, which would simply render estimates less efficient, but also for 
some systematic measurement error as well. Results are fully robust. The same is true if we 
impose larger measurement error on stronger earthquakes and lower measurement error on 
smaller earthquakes (results not shown), rather than the same proportional extent of 
measurement error on all quakes as in table 3. This suggests that potential measurement error 
is unlikely to have a significant impact on our results. 
7. Conclusion 
The politics of disaster mortality prevention exerts a large influence on actual disaster 
mortality rates. We have argued here that governments face very different incentives to 
implement and enforce an effective system of quake-proof construction regulations. One main 
influence on government policies comes from earthquake propensity. If earthquakes tend to 
be rare and – if they do occur – tend to be moderate, governments are unlikely to implement 
an effective earthquake mortality prevention system, because this regulation is costly in the 
absence of major earthquakes. In the rare event of a major earthquake, however, the lack of ex 
ante incentives to implement preventive measures leads to higher actual mortality.  
Even if earthquakes are relatively frequent and potentially strong, governments may opt 
against implementation of effective earthquake mortality prevention regulation when the 
country is relatively poor. Under this condition, the ex ante opportunity costs of such 
regulation can be prohibitively high if the government can save many more expected lives at 
lower cost in other areas of social or health spending. 
Finally, political institutions influence governments’ response to earthquake propensity. 
Political institutions not only exert an influence on the extent to which governments are 
willing to provide, and can credibly commit themselves to providing, the public good of 32 
earthquake morality prevention. Political institutions also condition the extent to which 
governments will respond to higher earthquake propensity. In sum, earthquake propensity 
together with economic and political incentives explain why earthquake mortality varies 
widely even after controlling for the seismic energy and the location of actually occurring 
quakes. These interaction effects indicate that, independent of the degree to which higher 
earthquake propensity reduces mortality because of learning by doing, propensity has a 
significant impact on the opportunity costs of mitigating risks. If learning by doing were 
costless, and were the only reason that propensity affected mortality, then the effects of 
propensity would be independent of the income and political characteristics of countries.   
Critics have been quick to put the blame on politicians and their apparent failure to 
prevent or at least reduce mortality from earthquakes. Yet, our theory suggests that in 
countries with low quake propensity, failure to enact and enforce regulations for earthquake-
proof construction is not necessarily a failure, but may be perfectly rational, following 
opportunity cost considerations. Our empirical results corroborate this view. We thus find that 
mortality and earthquake propensity are related in precisely the way one would expect if 
governments were welfare-maximizing: where propensity is higher, mortality is significantly 
lower and poor countries respond less to higher quake propensity, precisely as expected, given 
the higher opportunity costs for poor countries of investing in earthquake mortality 
prevention. At the same time, we have also argued and demonstrated empirically that the 
presence of political market imperfections (lack of elections or of credible politicians) has a 
large effect on how countries react to earthquake propensity. In the extreme cases, a higher 
quake propensity has no significant effect on mortality in autocracies that lack 
institutionalized ruling parties or in corrupt regimes. Our results thus suggest that policy 
advice to countries regarding disaster preparedness should strongly depend on the political 
characteristics of these countries. 33 
Table 1. Main estimation Results. 
Dependent variable:  annual sum of earthquake deaths model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5 
max_magnitude 0.0000222* 0.0000367** 0.0000234*  0.0000450** 0.0000374*
  (0.0000115) (0.0000177) (0.0000124) (0.0000210) (0.0000225)
magnitude_popdensity 0.0209**  0.0193**  0.0209*** 0.0221***  0.0123 
 (0.00854)  (0.00772)  (0.00809)  (0.00700)  (0.0151) 
quake propensity   -0.00366***        
 (0.00103)         
quake propensity in developing countries    -0.00304***      
   (0.00104)       
quake propensity in developed countries    -0.00885***      
   (0.00143)       
quake propensity in autocracies      -0.00293*     
     (0.00165)     
quake propensity in democracies      -0.00445***     
     (0.00153)     
quake propensity in autocracies         0.00256   
   w. low institutionalization        (0.00259)   
quake propensity in autocracies         -0.00277***   
   w. high institutionalization        (0.00103)   
quake propensity in young democracies        -0.00457***   
       (0.00158)   
quake propensity in old democracies        -0.00813***   
  (0.00107) 
quake propensity in corrupt countries    -0.00189
         (0.00262) 
quake propensity in non-corrupt countries          -0.00639***
         (0.00210) 
ln gdppc  -0.513*  -0.331  -0.521*  -0.649**  -0.780*** 
 (0.267)  (0.268)  (0.268) (0.325) (0.285) 
democracy -1.558***  -1.512** -1.348* 0.531  -1.916** 
 (0.595)  (0.616)  (0.774) (0.930) (0.932) 
ln pop  0.657***  0.675***  0.625***  0.994***  0.641*** 
 (0.216)  (0.218)  (0.227) (0.279) (0.248) 
lack of corruption          -0.177 
         (0.292) 
Constant  -2.524 -4.245 -2.057  -9.444**  0.650 
 (3.957)  (4.278)  (4.109) (4.141) (4.777) 
Observations 1696  1692  1696  1065  867 
Period of study  1960-2005 1960-2005  1960-2005 1975-2005  1982-2005
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered on countries. * significant at p<.1  ** at p<.05  *** at p<.01. 34 
Table 2. Robustness tests. 
propensity in autocracies   0.000213  0.00920  0.00245**  0.00201  0.00143 
   w. low institutionalization  (0.000220)  (0.00935)  (0.00122)  (0.00254)  (0.00303) 
propensity in young democracies  -0.000295***  -0.0188***  -0.00110***  -0.00476***  -0.00440** 





Notes: Standard errors clustered on countries. * significant at p<.1  ** at p<.05  *** at p<.01. 
Dependent variable:  annual sum of 
earthquake deaths 
Propensity:  > 5  
(Richter) 




Only quakes > 6 
(Richter) 
Executive years in 
office incl. 
Model 1           
quake propensity   -0.000248***  -0.0139***  -0.00114***  -0.00387***  -0.00343** 
 (0.0000688)  (0.00382)  (0.000273)  (0.000981)  (0.00166) 
Model 2           
propensity in developing countries -0.000207***  -0.0118*** -0.000997*** -0.00332*** -0.00275* 
 (0.0000698)  (0.00378)  (0.000240)  (0.000908)  (0.00160) 
propensity in developed countries  -0.000740***  -0.0316***  -0.00172***  -0.00940***  -0.0103*** 
  (0.000116) (0.00527) (0.000333)  (0.00154)  (0.00187) 
Model 3           
propensity in autocracies  -0.000202*  -0.0114**  -0.00104***  -0.00311**  -0.000981 
  (0.000121) (0.00556) (0.000267)  (0.00150)  (0.00230) 
propensity in democracies  -0.000286*** -0.0173*** -0.00134*** -0.00472*** -0.00752*** 
  (0.000109) (0.00541) (0.000313)  (0.00141)  (0.00161) 
Model 4 
propensity in autocracies   -0.000184**  -0.0104***  -0.000548**  -0.00254**  -0.00207** 
   w. high institutionalization  (0.0000724)  (0.00375)  (0.000232)  (0.00101)  (0.000985) 
propensity in old democracies -0.000568***  -0.0300*** -0.00173*** -0.00800***  -0.00809*** 
 (0.0000870)  (0.00418)  (0.000303)  (0.00110)  (0.00103) 
Model 5           
propensity in corrupt countries  -0.000173  -0.00596  -0.000949**  -0.00225  0.00303** 
 (0.000205) (0.0100) (0.000415) (0.00242) (0.00149)
propensity in non-corrupt countries  -0.000564*** -0.0243*** -0.00133*** -0.00718*** -0.00381*
  (0.000169) (0.00749) (0.000301)  (0.00190)  (0.00216) 35 
Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Monte Carlo Analysis testing the Importance of Measurement Error (based on 100 iterations) 
propensity in autocracies   0.00699  0.00055  0.00512  0.00887 
   w. low institutionalization  0.00669 0.00037 0.00492 0.00748
propensity in young democracies  -0.00630  0.00018  -0.00697  -0.00561 
 0.00171  0.00003  0.00161  0.00177 
 
  Mean Std.  Dev.  Mininum  Maximum 
Model 1         
quake propensity   -0.00365  0.00011  -0.00397  -0.00339 
 0.00104  0.00002  0.00096  0.00109 
Model 2         
propensity in developing countries  -0.00302  0.00010  -0.00330  -0.00268 
 0.00105  0.00003  0.00098  0.00116 
propensity in developed countries  -0.00886  0.00015  -0.00938  -0.00853 
 0.00143  0.00002  0.00139  0.00149 
Model 3         
propensity in autocracies  -0.00293  0.00015  -0.00351  -0.00257 
 0.00165  0.00010  0.00132  0.00205 
propensity in democracies  -0.00445  0.00014  -0.00490  -0.00384 
 0.00152  0.00005  0.00135  0.00177 
Model 4         
propensity in autocracies   -0.00353  0.00011  -0.00380  -0.00322 
   w. high institutionalization  0.00116  0.00004  0.00102  0.00125 
propensity in old democracies  -0.00905  0.00011  -0.00933  -0.00878 
 0.00097  0.00002  0.00093  0.00102 
Model 5         
propensity in corrupt countries  -0.00143  0.00025  -0.00214  -0.00082 
 0.00290  0.00010  0.00261  0.00317 
propensity in non-corrupt countries  -0.00675 0.00023 -0.00747 -0.00603
 0.00216 0.00006 0.00200 0.0023036 
Appendix 1. The exponential nature of the Richter scale in terms of explosive equivalent. 
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